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1 
Introduction 
Earnings from exports comprise 25 per cent of New Zealand's gross 
national product. (l) On a per capita basis therefore, New Zealand 
is one of the foremost trading countries in the world, but in con-
trast to other developed market economy countries it relies heavily 
on a narrow range of raw or semi processed primary commodities for 
its export income and its economic development. (2 ) Thus the pro-
duction of agricultural commodities for export has always had an 
important influence on fiscal and monetary policies adopted by 
successive governments. In addition where credit facilities for 
farm producers and processing companies have not been regarded as 
adequate or appropriate to the importance of the agricultural 
sector in the economy, the Government has developed institutions 
to correct this situation. 
The preoccupation with diversifying the economy through indust-
rialisation and through the growth of manufactured exports which 
has characterised the thinking of both political parties since the 
late 1950's has also led to monetary and fiscal policies being 
directed to promoting manufactured exports. State finance and 
insurance companies were established to cover the particular needs 
of new and developing exporting industries, where their financing 
or insurance needs might not have been readily undertaken by exist-
( 1) 
( 2) 
International Financial Statistics Vol. XXVI, No 5 May 1973 
at p 268 
k 
Export receipts from mild products, meat and wool in 1972 were 
$333.7 million, $482.3 m, $308 m, respectively comprising to-
gether 75 per cent of total exports. , Other primar~ production 
notably forest products of the above industries, fush, fruit , 
and honey comprised another 17 per cent RENZ Bulletin April 
1973 at p. 65. 
Victoria '.Jniversity of 
VVellington 
L2.N Library 
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ing private institutions providing similar services. 
This paper is concerned with certain legal aspects of State in-
tervention in this area. The legal framework within which the 
Government executes its monetary policies will need to be examined. 
This largely involves consideration of legislation. While State 
intervention is invariably accompanied by statutory law and sub-
sidiary forms of legislation it is also affected by aspects of 
law which have not received statutory definition. It is fLrst 
necessary to examine briefly the State institutions with an inter-
est in pre-shipment and post-shipment finance and their relation-
ship with the Government. 
l · 
PART I 3 
State intervention in the Agricultural Sector 
There are special characteristics of farming operationswhich 
give rase to credit needs which differ significantly in nature from 
those of other primary borrowers and lenders in the economy. In 
addition farm income receipts are both subject to marked seasonal 
concentration and may vary sharply from year to year because of 
fluctuating prices in export markets. (
3 ) The Government through 
its agencies the State Advances Corporation (
4 ) and State Life 
Insurance companies plays the principal role in lending to the 
farming sector mainly for the purchase of land. 
Some stocking and working capital requirements of farmer's have 
traditionally been met by trading banks and stock and station trad-
ing companies which conduct specialised banking operations ancillary 
to their main wool, livestock and shipping business. 
( 5) These 
institutions are subject to extensive control by the Reserve Bank 
(3) The NZ Financial System Monetary and Economic Council, Report 
No. 10 March 1966. 
(4) A special rural division of the SAC has recently been establish-
ed. See Budget Statement 14 June 1973 Govt. Printer Wellington. 
(5) The financial operations or these companies involves the main-
tenance of current account, the acceptance of time deposits 
and the granting of secured and unsecured advances. Current 
accounts are utilised by farmers to hold the proceeds of the 
sale of produce and to which farm and personal expenses are 
cha~ged. The surplus may be placed with the companies on fixed 
deposit. {Cbntinuing advances are generally secured and are not 
intended to be repaid within the normal seasonal production 
period. These adva.nces are part of a farmers permanent capital. 
Temporary unsecured advances are made in the anticipation of 
the receipt of seasonal income. Unsecured advances are gen-
erally equal to about 60 per cent of bank advances to farmers 
illustrating the importance of stock and station agents as 
sources of farm credit. Reserve Bank of NZ pub. Money and 
Banking in New Zealand 1963 Govt. Printer p. 26. 
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in terms of the Reserve Bank Amendment Act 1973. (6 ) The greatest 
requirement for finance comes from the industries processing and 
transporting primary produce. The trading banks are the key fin-
ancial institution in the private sector providing seasonal 
finance for agricultural and processing industries. The trading 
banks have a unique function in the intemediation process and with 
the aid of the monetary authorities are able to accommodate large 
seasonal fluctuations in the needs of primary industry. 
( 7) Over-
seas trading of certain of these agricultural products is however 
in the hands of statutory marketing authorities, whose financial 
requirements are accommodated by the Reserve Bank. 
(6) See Part II 
(7) Monetary Policy and the Financial System NZ Monetary and 
Economic Council Report No. 24. 
2. 
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Industrial Sector 
The Development Finance Corporation 
The major instrument of direct governmentinte..ivention into 
the field of leading for the production of manufactured and 
capital goods for export is the State owned corporation the Dev-
elopment Finance Corporation. ( 7 ) Although restrictions, stat-
utory or otherwise, have until recently been placed on the lend-
ing activities of the Corporation, the intention of the present 
government is for the Corporation to be 'the principal channel 
through which assistance is given to industry on a selective 
basis. ' 
( 8) 
(7) The DFC had its origins in the recommendations of the In-
dustrial Development Conference 1960 and the recommendations 
of the T2riff and Development ~Board concerning industrial 
development in 1962 . Although established by an Act of 
Parliament the corporation commenced as a mixed enterprise. 
Of the $2 million capital which had been issued up to 1971 
from the $4 million authorised by the Act, the Reserve Bank's 
statutori ly required 30 per cent (s.4) had been taken up with 
the remaining 70 per cent taken up by the trading banks and 
insurance companies. The Corporation was also limited to 
being a lender of l ast resort. (s.8 (1) This limitation 
was repealed by an amending Act in 1970. The present Gover-
nment bought out the shares of private interests in 1973 and 
at the time of writing had introduced a bill into Parliament 
validating the takeover and reconstituting the Corporation. 
The bill increas es the nominal capital to $10 million and 
contains a new provision authorising the Minister of Trade 
and Industry to give the corporation directions on general 
policy•l Minor amendments have also been made to the cor-
poration's functions and powers to enable it to encourage 
NZ industries to enter in joint ventures in overseas markets 
where these would benefit the NZ economy. Development 
Finance Corporation Amending Bill 1973. It has recently 
entered the short term deposit taking arena. 'Sunday Herald' .. 
August 12 1973. 
(8) The Budget Statement, 4 June, 1973. Govt. Printing Office. 
The lending functions of the Corporation of relevance to 
the financing of export production are set out ins.& of the 
principal Act. In exercising its functions the Corporation is 
to lend primarily for medium or long term (9 ) periods and to 
give particular attention to the needs of small and medium 
sized businesses. It is also to encourage the establishment 
or expansion of industries which will benefit inter alia the 
econom¥ as a whole or which will otherwise benefit the balance 
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of payments. (10) Further to lending for the purposes of export 
production in New Zealand the Corporation may lend for the 
purpose of 'assisting persons to set up or expand development 
projects overseas that will benefit the New Zealand economy, ( 11) 
In order to carry out its functions the DFC may also enter into 
or participate in underwriting or sub-underwriting in respect of 
the issue of shares and debentures, or give guarantees. It may 
also participate in a joint lending arrangement. (12) 
The new relationship between the Government and the DFC is 
illustrated by the use of a different technique enabling the 
DFC to administer two schemes designed to assist export production. 
(9) DFC loans are usually granted for terms between 7 and 12 
years and in most cases borrowers are excused from making 
capital repayments during the first year. 
(10) In submitting a request for finance the applicants are asked 
to comment on any aspects of export earnings in the prop-
osal. Guid~nce sheet for a request for finance DFC sheet, 
Dev, 2/1. The DFC lenders policy statement also states 
that opportunities for export production will be favourable 
factors influencing a DFC decision. 
(11) s 6. (2) (d) inserted by the DFC Amendment Act 1970 s.2. 
(12) s 7. 
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Provision was made in the 1973: budget (l 3 ) for the institution 
of an export suspensory loan scheme and a mortgage guarantee 
scheme, the administration of which is vested in the DFC under 
delegated authority from the Government. 
The export suspensory loan scheme contains a number of inter-
esting features. (l 4 ) The broad features of the scheme are that 
for certain investment projects designed to achieve a high ex-
port performance, a grant of 40 per cent of the capital cost of 
plant and machinery is available. The grant takes the form of 
a suspensory loan subject to interest at rates normally changed 
by the DFC. (15) The suspensory loan is to be written off in 
full if 40 per cent of the output of the project is exported 
over any 3 year period within the first five years. Qualifying 
projects are normally restiicted to those with a capital cost 
of not more that $100,000 giving a maximum grant of $40,000. 
Consideration may also be given by the DFC to special cases~ 
however involving amounts in excess of this maximum but the 
authorisation of Government is required. The loan does not 
crystallise into a grant until a submission is made by the 
borrower supported by satisfactory evidence that the required 
percentage of exportable production has been achieved. The 
DFC however is vested with a discretion to consider a proport-
ionate grant if the exports exceed 20 per cent of the planned 
production but fall short of the 40 per cent target. If the 
(13) Budget Statement op cit. 
(14) DFC Sheet: Advice to Manufacturers - Export suspensory 
Loans July 1973. 
(15) For projects which are strongly developmental in character, 
financially viable and with a sound credit rating, an int-
erest rate in the vicinity of 8 per cent is normally charged. 
Ibid 
applicant is unable to export 20 per cent of planned pro1uction 
the repayment terms come into effect. 
A prerequisite to qualifying under the scheme is related to 
another statutory regulation. 
The scheme only applies to purchase of new plant and machin-
ery to be used in a project for the manufacture of products of 
a type which qualify under the increased Export Tax incentive 
scheme. (l 6 ) In respects other than the special developmental 
8 
and export promotion characteristics, the loan is treated on a 
strictly cormnercial basis, particularly in terms of credit worthi-
ness, the risk factors involved, and security available. 
The mortgage guarantee scheme as its name suggests involves 
a guarantee by the DFC to the mortgagee of repayment and interest 
of up to $100,000 for buildings owned and occupied by small and 
medium companies which are exporting or are able to obtain a 
high level of productivity. In this way the mortgagor is able 
to reduce the gap between the cost of building and the funds 
normally available to this type of borrower on a first mortgage. 
A loan agreement for $8 million between the DFC and the 
(16) i.e. generally for goods of a sophisticated nature based 
on processing of locally produced materials and food. 
9 
International Bank for Reconstriction and Development in 1971 
demonstrates the use of the Corporation's borrowing powers under 
sl7. Under the section the Corporation is empowered to borrow 
up to an amount not exceeding five times the authorised capital 
of the Corporation. If it seeks a guarantee from Government, 
however the loan is to be subject to such terms and conditions 
as the Minister thinks fit. The negotiation of the loan was 
in fact initiated by Government and negotiated by officials of 
the Minister's department. Under the terms of the agreement which 
is guaranteed by Government in terms of s.18, the loan is to be 
used to finance the imported content of approved development 
projects in New Zealand; the loan is particularly intended to 
assist in the provision of long term pre-shipment finance of 
. (11) forest industries and meat processing. · 
Government has also had recourse to the power under s 18 (a) 
of the Act enabling the Minister of Finance to advance money 
to the Corporation. In 1972 the Corporation obtained a loan 
from the Government on the terms that it be relent to mP-at 
companies to assist in financing the renewal of meat processing 
plants to enable them to reach more stringent hygiene requirements. 
It is apparent therefore that the Corporation is playing an 
increasing role in the provision of pre-shipment finance. Despite 
(17) Annual Report of the Department of Trade and Industry 
Appendices Journals H.O. Rep. H.44 1972. 
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a recommendation by the National Development Conference, (l 8 ) 
the Corporation has not yet been permitted to engage in the 
provision of post-shipment export finance in cooperation with 
trading banks and the Reserve Bank. In any event"its specialised 
function as a development bank would seem to disqualify it from 
entering this field . 
(18) Annual R~port of the DFC 1968/69 
11 
PART II 
The Central Bank of New Zealand 
Introduction 
The primary instrument of the State in the financing of 
New Zealand's export trade is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. 
The Bank acquires responsibilities in this area as a consequence 
of the powers and functions vested in it by statute, relating to 
the regulation and control of credit in New Zealand. It plays 
both a direct and an indirect role in promoting trade, on behalf 
of the Government, either role involving recourse to the organic 
law of its institution. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 1964 
is the fundamental source of central bank law in New ~~al.and, but 
in exercising its powers and in its operation the Bank is also 
affected by other domestic sources of law namely legislation app-
lied to o~he~ banks 2nd common law. (l) Certain rules of inter-
national law also affect the Bank in performing its task as banker 
both to the Government and to certain statutory marketing auth-
orities. 
For the most part it is not possible to isolate the exercise 
law by the Reserve Bank in the field of export credit to promote 
trade from that relating to the creation or restriction of ex-
pansive credit conditions generally. The exercise ©fits p~wers 
(1) For consideration of the comparative sources of domestic law 
which affect central banks see Hans Aufricht. Comparative 
Survey of Central Bank Law, London 1965 
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in respect to domestic monetary policy inevitably has consequences 
as regards the ability of the trading banks to finance export 
credits. On the other hand the Bank incertain situations be-
comes a party to specific export credit trans a ctions. Before 
proceeding it is necessary to examine the constitution and 
functions and powers of the Bank. 
2 . The Structure of the Reserve Bank 
The organic law of theBank is contained in the Reserve Bank 
of New Zeala nd Acit 1964. 
( 2) 
Under s 3 the Bank is designated 
as a body corporate attached with certain attributes of a body 
corporate ( 3 ) management of the Bank the Board of Directors are 
(2) The legislative history of the Reserve Bank commenced with 
the Reserve~~ank Act 1933. Despite early proposals in 1886 
and in 1913 ~the establishment of a Central Bank, these pro-
posals were not seriously considered until the depression 
in 1930 when the NZ Government invited Sir Otto Niemeyer, 
formerly of the British Treasury and a recognised expert on 
central banking to report on New Ze a,l and ~:s banking and 
currency system. On the basis of the Niemeyer report (Bank-
ing and Currency in New Zealand, Wellington Governmenu 
Printing Office 1931) the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act 
was passed by the then Reform Government which constituted 
the Bank as a body corporate with a share capital of 100 , 000 
publicly subscribed shares of 5 pounds each and a Reserve 
Fund of 1 million pounds provided by the State. One of the 
first acts of the Labour Government was to pass the Reserve 
Bank Amendment Act 1936 which enabled the shares to be 
purchased by Government to make it a fully State owned inst-
itution. In addition a number of new powers were granted to 
the Bank notabl~ in respect of controlling trading banks 
and the adherence of the Bank to Government monetary policy. 
Its powers were further strengthened in 1939, in 1946 (by 
the Finance Act No. 2), and in 1960. The present Act has 
been substantively amended by the Reserve Bank Amendment Act 
1973 passed on 1 September which gives the Bank much wider 
powers in respect of the regulation of financial institutions 
other than banks. For a comprehensive economic history of 
the Bank see GR Hawke - Between Governments and Banks, 
Wellington Government Printer 1973. 
declared by the Act to constitute the body corporate. ( 4) The 
body corporate is also designated a bank. It has a legal status 
however distinct from that of other banks. Except for certain 
provisions the Banking Act 1908 is expressly declared not to 
apply to it. 
( 5) 
The only provisions which are declared by the 
Act to apply are ss 19-26 of the Banking Act and s 3 of the 
Banking Amendment Act 1935 (relating to bank holidays, hours of 
business and book entries) and s 9 (1) Statutes Amendment Act 
1946 (relating to banking hours.) In addition in the event 
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of any conflict between the Act and the provisions of the Bahking 
Act 1908 or for that matter any other Act relating to any bank or 
to the business of banking, the provisions of the Reserve Bank 
Act are to apply. 
A further immediate distinction between the Bank and other 
banks is that it is restricted from conducting business which 
other banks may comtemplate in the course of their business. 
Except with the authority of the Governor-General it is prohibited 
from engaging in trade, or otherwise have a direct interest in any 
commercial, industrial, financial or similar undertaking. Similar 
to other banks it is not permitted to purchase or subscribe for 
the shares of any trading bank or any financial institution in 
New Zealand or elsewhere. It is also prohibited from lending 
(3) The Bank is however, exempted from public taxation (not 
including local rates) to the same extent as the Crown, s 
46. The Companies Act has however limited application to 
banks see Part I. 
(4) s 4. The directors comprise the Governor, the Deputy Governor, 
the Secretary to the Treasury and seven other directors 
appointed by the Governor-General. Certain cate:.§ories of 
persons are disqualified from holding the office of director 
under s 5. Directors are not personally liable for any act 
done by the Bank or by any director in good faith in the 
course of the operations of the Banks 16. 
(5) Reserve Bank Act s47 (2). The former provision to this effect 
money on the security of any shares that the Bank is prohibited 
from purchasing. 
( 6) 
3. The Primary Functions of the Bank 
There is no ready description of the role of a central bank 
and the entity is invariably defined by listing the- objectives 
of the institution and on the other hand its functions and 
powers. 
( 7) 
The essence of central banking has however been 
described as the control of the monetary system to serve the 
interests of the general public. These interests are translated 
into specific objectives which evolve with the changing economic 
demands of society (S) Recourse must now be had to the Act to 
ascertain these specific objectives. 
The primary functions of the Bank are set out ins 8. (9 ). 
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While certain functions are enumerated, s 9 (1) makes it clear that 
the list is not intended to be exhaustive. The primary functions 
under the news 8 are: 
(1) a~o act as the central bank for New Zealand; and 
b) To ensure that the availability and conditions of credit 
provided by financial institutions are not inconsistent with 
now repealed was contained in the Banking Act itself. 
(6) Reserve Bank Acts 10. 
(7) Hawke op cit. p. 9. 
(8) H.H. Binhammer, Money, Banking and the Canadiam Financial 
System. Methven 1972 at p 215. 
(9) as substituted bys 5 of the Reserve Bank Amendment Act 1973. 
the sovereign right of the Crown to control money and 
credit in the public interest; 
c) To advise the Government on matters relating to the mone-
tary policy, banking credit, and overseas exchange; and 
d) Within the limits of its powers, to give effect to the 
monetary policy of the Government as communicated in 
writing to the Bank. 
The Act also makes it clear that Government's monetary policy 
should be directed to the maintenance and promotion of economic 
and social welfare in New Zealand. Although the concept is not 
specifically defined it is stated that the policy should be re-
lated to the desireabili ty of promoting the highest level of 
d . d d f 11 1 ( lO) d f · ' ' · pro uction, tra e an u emp_ oyment an o maintannnng~.a 
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stable internal price level. The objectives are in fact mutually 
dependent and while a specific objective is the promotion of trade 
(both internal and external) the realisation of the other broad 
objectives of ecomonic growth, a jhigh degree of production and 
the need to maintain a stable internal price level are equally 
necessary conditions for the stimulation of exports. 
Similarily it is not possible to isolate any particular powers 
and functions which are of relevance only to the export sector. 
In fact the Bank has been invested with a considerably broader 
mandate than that accorded to it by the original Act of 1933. 
It may subject to specific exclusions contained ins 10 ... ' do 
any other business or exercise any other powers incidental to 
or consequential on any of the provisions of the Act' ... ~pecific 
functions and powers however, are granted to the Bank in many 
(10) s 8 (2) 
L 
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ways similar to other banks, Under s 9 it may 'establish cred·:its' , 
buy, sell, discount and rediscount, bills of exchange, promissory 
notes and with the prior consent of the Minister, underwrite 
loans. Unlike banks it is empowered to give or accept guanantees 
in any currency and on terms providing for repayment or payment, 
as the case may require in the same or any other currency. Each 
of these particular empowering classes have in fact been used for 
the benefit of the export sector either i i association with 
its specific powers in the area of monetary policy or independently 
of those powers. 
The Legal Relationship between the Bank and Government 
At the time of the establishment of the Bank in 1933, the 
traditional view of economists and the then Government was that 
the Bank should have a large measure of independence from Govern-
ment control and political interference. (ll) Several amendments 
have however been made to the original section (l2 ) refiecting 
this thinking, which have evidenced differences between the 
(11) F.W.Holmes Money, Finance and the Economy Heineman 1972 at 
p. 8 3. 
(12) s 12 RB Act 1933. 
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two major political parties over the extent of the control that 
should be exercised by Government. (l 3 ) Accordingly the recent 
amendment to the Act has also made a number of substantive changes. 
The present Act requires the Bank not only to give effect to the 
monetary policy (l 4 ) of the Government but it also grants the 
Minister of Finance greater powers in respect to the management 
of the Bank's operations. 
(13) The precise relationship of the Bank to Government was 
not given statutory definition until 1936 when the s 10 of 
the RB Amendment Act 1936 repealed the formers 12. The 
drafting of the new clause however did not have the desired 
effect and was drawn more definitively in a further amendment 
in 1939. This required the Bank to give effect to any 
decision of the Government relating to the functions or 
business of the Bank. In addition it was required to have 
regard to representations by the Minister of Finance. In 
1950 the National Government removed from the Minister of 
Finance to the House of Representatives the power to give 
specific instructions on the management of the Bank. The 
Labour Government responded by passing the RB Amendment Act 
1960 which substituted the 1939 amendment for the earlier 
clause, almost in its entireiy, The 1964 Act removed the 
clause and made no specific provisions for the instruction 
management. The RB Amendment Act 1973 ( s 5) made a number 
of substantive changes to s 8 Act which in effect go further 
than any earlier clauses. That the controversy concerning 
political interference in the Banks operation is still alive, 
is also illustrated by the fact that major portion of the 
debates,cmthe amending Act dwelt on the proposal to have a 
Ministerial appointee on the Executive Committee of the 
Board of Governors, see Hansard NZPO June 13. For the 
history of the constitutional relations between the Govern-
ment and the Bank 1933-82 see Hawke op cit pbl et seq. 
(14) The Government's monetary policy is to conform with certain 
objectives also. These are however counched in such wide 
terms, that it is difficult to conceive of these as operating 
to limit Government action. 
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The 'soverign right' of the Crown of control currency and 
credit is expressly declared in the preamble to the present Act, 
The general legal relationship between the Bank and Government 
is defined by way of listing the primary fuctions of the Bank. 
The Bank is to: 
'give effect to the monetary policy of the Government as 
communicated in writing to the Bank arld to any resolution of 
Parliament in relation to that monetary policy.' 
and 
'for the purposes of this Act, the Minister may from time 
to time communicate to the Bank the monetary policy of the 
Government.' 
The form of the provision therefore indicates that monetary 
policy may be communicated both by discussions between the Min-
ister of Finance and the Governor, and by exchanges of corresp-
ondence between them. Obviously therefore while the Bank is 
specifically required to give effect of communications in writing 
it will also as a matter of practice immediately give effect 
to a communication by oral discussion where this is required, 
with formal advice from the Minister being received at a later 
date. 
Other sections of the Act provide in theory for a different 
legal relationship between the Bank and Government. For instance 
under s 33 the Reserve Bank may initiate a proposal to require 
the trading banks to hold liquid assets, which then requires 
the approval of the Minister. On the other hand the news 8 (3) 
requires the Bank to regulate and control credit as directed by 
the Minister. (15) The news 8 (4) obliges the Bank to make 
loans to the Government on such conditions as the Minister 
decides from time to time. A new form of Government control 
of action which might previously have been considered to be 
within the sphere of the Res e rve Bank is contained ins 34 (8) 
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which relates to financial institutions. The execut·ive branch 
of Government through the medium of the Governor General is 
empowered to require for instance financial institutions from 
time to time to hold balances at the Bank or a trading Bank. (16) 
On the other hand in respect of similar provisions dat i ng from 
the earlier Act pertaining to trading banks, (l 7 ) the Bank has 
the initiative. 
The contemporary law of the Reserve Bank thus indicates that 
the subordination of the Bank to Government decision has found 
statutory definition although in a variety of ways, some of which 
in view of the aim of the new legislation are obviously anomalous. 
To a large extent however, the new statutory provisions merely 
formalise a de facto situation, which has evolved by convention, 
(l 9 ) namely that all decisions of substance are a matter for the 
government. The distinction between the policy role of the 
Government and the management role of the Bank (in regard to 
the expansion or restriction or credit) envisaged by the original 
(15) The formers 8 (3) of the RB Act 1964 read ' the Bank may 
on behal f of the Government, regulate and control etc' 
(16) The form of this provision in fact is remarkably similar 
to that enabling fiscal measures to be adopted. 
(17) RB Acts 33 
(18) This position has been recognized by a senior officer of 
the Bank see R.S. Deane, The Function of the Reserve Bank, 
RBNZ Bulletin September 1972, at p. 215. 
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draftsmen has therefore been largely lost. The importance of the 
Bank now lies in its function of advising the Government. (l
9 ) 
(19) RB Amendment Acts 8 (1) (c). 
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B. Legal Relation between the Bank and the New Zealand Financial 
Corrununity. 
The most important functions undertaken by the Bank on behalf 
of Government, affecting the financing of export trade, lie in the 
area of monetary policy. Simply stated, the principal objective of 
monetary policy is to influence spending decisions in the public 
interest. (2 0) In order to execute this objective, the present Act 
hasarmed the Bank with considerable powers, which when invoked, 
form the basis of particular legal relationships between the Bank, 
and the financial corrununity. these relate to teshniqies in corrunon 
use in central bank practice. Each involves not only the invocat-
ion of specific statutory law, but the use of different m~ures, to 
ensure its implementation. 
The relative effectiveness of the various tools employed in New 
Zealand to implement the monetary policy of Government has been un-
der active consideration in recent years coincidinq with changes in 
economic thinking, and the growing sophistication and diversity of 
the New Zealand money market. The merits or demerits of these tools 
in the New Zealand financial environment, and suggestions for re-
placement, are discussed elsewhere. 
(21) The importance of these 
techniques for our purposes, is that whatever technique is employed 
the Government has always ensured that the export sector is direct-
ly affected, as little as possible, when they are used to tighten 
internal credit conditions. They are also important for the reason 
that the export sector receives the benefit of the subsequent im-
provement in domestic economic conditions. 
(20) 
(21) 
"Monetary policy is mainly concerned with influencing the 
private sector 1 s spending money, by varying the amount which 
the Governmant, including the Reserve Bank, borrows from the 
private sector, and by varying the cost of borrowing, the 
cost of selling or redeeming a financial asset in order to 
spend on goods and services." A~dress by the R.BNZ ~overnor to 
Economic Socie~y, Wellington, 31st May, 1973. printed in RBNZ 
Bulletin. July, 1973. 
e.g. N.Z. Monetary and Economic Council Monetary Policy and the 
Financial Ststem Rep.No. 24. Dec.1972.p67-81, and earlier see 
the Councils Report employed by the Bank, see Address pl71. 
Particularly on the introduction of the reserve assets ratio 
system. 
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Before proceeding, it is necessary to understand the general legal 
framework in which relations are conducted. 
The primary law. 
The primary law governing the regulation and control of credit 
and thereby the relationship between the financial community and 
the Bank is s. 8(3), which states in part: 
"The Bank shall, as directed by the Minister, regulate and con-
trol on behalf of the Government -
(a) Money, banking; banking transactions, any class of trans-
actions of financial institutions, credit currency, and the borr-
owing and lending of money. 
(b) Rates of interest in respect of such classes of transaction 
as may from time to time be prescribed. (
22 ) 
(22) s.8(3), as substituted by s.5 of the RB Amendment Act 1973. 
The major distinction between this section, and the former 
s.S(]), is that it empowers the Bank to regulate credit from 
fron a l l : so11.:-c:e s, and not just bank credit. The law relating 
to monetary control of the non banks is not further dealt 
with in detail, because the principal providers of export 
finance are the trading banks, and special measures taken 
by the Government concern only trading banks. Certain of 
these institutions however, have an increasing role in the 
provision of export finance, and a brief review of the app-
lication of monetary policy towards them, is useful. The 
inequity of forcing the banks to carry the main burden in 
times of tight credit, while little monetary constraints 
were placed on these institutions, was progressively recog-
nized by the Bank and the Government from 1960 onwards. The 
1964 Act authorized the Bank to require information of those 
that carried on as a substantial part of their N.Z. business, 
the acceptance of deposits or other banking business, the 
granting of credit, or lending for the financing of industry, 
trade or commerce. The Bank was also empowered to make re-
commendations to them. By s.28A, which was inserted by an 
amending Act in 1970, the Executive branch was empowered to 
require finance companies to hold specified investments, as 
defined in regulations under that section. The new s.34(c) 
in the principal Act enables orders in Council to be made 
requiring all financial institutions (other than trading 
banks), to hold assets of a minimum amount, in the form of 
balances, at a trading bank, or with the Reserve Bank~ 
Government or local securities, or other assets specified 
in the order. Under s.8 l(b), it is also a primary function 
of the Bank to ensure that the availability and conditions 
of credit provided by financial institutions, are not incon-
sistent with the sovreign right of the Crown to control 
credit in the public interest. Thus they are now accorded 
the i mportance appropriate to their influence. 
The special powers to introduce a number of techniques for 
this purpose, are contained in Part V of the principal Act. The 
following may be introduced; variable reserve ratios, selective 
control of advances (frequently referred to as advance control 
policy), and a reserve assets ratio system. These techniques 
have been introduced to operate individually, or in association 
with, or complementary to other techniques. 
(a) Variable Reserve Ratios. 
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The basic purpose of this technique is to control the quantity 
of credit. This is effected by immo1,ilising part of the cash (
23 ) 
of the banksp and leaving varying free margins, increasing the 
margin of free cash, in order to create tight money conditions. (
24 ) 
An increase in the ratio reduces the cash balances,which remain 
as a base for lending, and in times of stringent restraint, the 
ratios may be increased to a level which forces the trading banks 
to borrow from the Reserve Bank, the lender of last resort, in 
order to comply with the minimum required holdings. To reinforce 
this measure, the Bank may resort to the supplementary power of 
increasing the discount rate on borrowing by the banks. 
Under the 1933 Act, the trading banks were required to main-
tain balances in the Reserve Bank. The minimum balance required 
(2S)was 7 per-cent of demand liabilities, plus 3 per-cent of 
(23) Comprising holdings of coin, notes and credit balances at 
the Reserve Bank. 
(24) Money and Banking in New Zealand, RBNZ pub. Wellington, 1963, 
at pl02. The origional purpose of fixed reserve requirements 
was to protect bank's depositors, in the light of the abil-
ity of the banking system to expend its lending to many 
times the level of cash reserve. It was only later, that 
variation of the reserve requirement could be used as a con-
trol over bank advances. Hawke.Op Cit p152. 
(25) RBNZ Act 1933,s.45. 
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time liabilities, but the Governor of the Bank was later grant-
ed the power after obtaining the consent of the Minister of Fin-
ance, to vary these reserve ratios, although not to a level less 
than the respective minimum balances. (26 ) The power to vary the 
ratio, however, was not used until 1952, when bank advances in-
creased markedly, as a result of the boom in wool prices assoc-
iated with the Korean war. 
A new approach to credit control was taken by the Bank in 1956 
involving the power to vary the reserve ratios, as an enforce-
ment measure. The Bank established targets for the aggregate 
amounts permitted to be advanced by the trading banks on a monthly 
basis. (27 ) These were enforced by adjusting the minimum reserve 
requirements in order to "force the banks to borrow at the Re-
serve Bank amounts equal to the excess" ( 2 8) 
The 1964 Act removed the minimum reserve requirements, and 
permitted the Bank, subject to Ministerial approval, complete 
flexibility in applying the reserve ratios. (29 )Whenever the 
Bank establishes new ratios, notice is to be given in writing 
to all the trading banks a copy of which is required to be pub-
lished in the New Zealand Gazette. (3 0) The penalties for failinq 
to comply, are graduated in severity in accordance with the cir-
cumstances surrounding the failure of the trading bank concern-
ed. The Reserve Bank has t he discretion to issue a further dir-
ection to an offending bank. If such a notice is served on the 
trading bank, it is unlawful for the bank to continue granting 
(26) Ibid s.45(2). The power of variation was added by s.23 
of the RBNZ Amendment Act,1926. The power, however, was 
not exercised until 1952. 
(27) The Bank han no specific regulatory power to give direct-
ions concerning the aggregate amounts of advances the 
trading banks were to hold, The specific power was, how-
ever, granted to the Bank by s45 A, RBNZ A~11'Jndment Act,19fi0. 
(28) Holmes, Op Cit, at p92. 
( 2 9 ) RB Act 19 6 4 , s . 3 3 . 
(30) RB Act s.32 (1) and (5). The form of the earlier provision 
differ0. d slightly, in that only notice in the Gazette was 
required. 
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Credit. Wilful failure on the other hand, to comply with the 
minimum reserve requirements, is an offence involving fines for 
each day that the offence continues. (31) 
The target system for trading bank advances, however, remained 
the dominant method of controlling the level of credit, after the 
passage of the Act. It was also employed as the mai~ technique in 
encouraging the trading banks to invest in the export sector. (32 ) 
This was achieved by the progressive exclusion form the targets of 
advances to the export sector. The first benAficiaries of this 
approach were wool brokers, and stock and station agents. In 1965, 
the Bank advised the trading banks that the targets were to be div-
ided into two tiers. Credit control was concentrated on advances 
for purposes other than agricultural, and other expe rt production. 
The two tier approach existed in the same form until 1969( 33 ) 
As a result of the Government decision in 1969, the reserve 
ratios were frozen at 8 per-cent of demand deposits, and three per-
cent of time deposits. Under the ceilings system, the sector el-
igible for priority advances comprised all farmers, all s~ock and 
station agents, meat and freezing companies, wool buyers and spec-
ial export finance for manufacturers. The lower priority category 
of advances comprised those to retailers, wholesalers, local hodies, 
(31) cf RB Act 1933, s.45(4). 
(32) Special ~yuort finance ~as, however been made available u~inq 
the reserve r atio tecnique. In 1963, a special export finance 
arrangement was introduced, under which ter,1 loans ure made 
by banks from a fund established at the Bank, equal to 1 per-
cent of demand liabilities, which is provired from a special 
rel e ase of the Trading Banks balances, frozen at the Reserve 
Bank. Another 0.5 per-cent is provided for financing export 
promotion. Statement of the Minister of Finance, 20 December, 
1963, printed in RBNZ Bulletin, June 1963. 
(33) The ceiling penalty system adopted as a result of the 1Q69 
budget, is reviewed in RBNZ Bulletin, Sept. 1972, at p218. 
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most manufacturers, building firms and private individuals. If 
the ceilings were exceeded, the trading banks were penalized, un 
less the excess was due to an acceptable expansion in the export 
sector. Thus the export sector was for all practical purposes, (34 ) 
unrestricted. The technique of setting individual bank ceilings, 
was, however, suspended in in 1972. The banks operated instead, 
under an overall guideline policy for advances. If trading bank 
advances were reduced to a level acceptable to the Government, an 
adjustment was made to eliminate the penal borrowing. The rapid 
increase in export marketing advances up t0 1972, had, however, 
caused concern to the Bank, and as a consequence, the guideline 
n0 t ic e also included guidelines for export advances. This allow-
ed for normal seasonal requirements, and for an increase related 
to the expected rise in farm production and exports. The notice 
requested the banks to scrutinise closely, the level of their ad-
vances for export marketing, and to ensure that any excess over 
the guidelines was required to finance only the working capital 
of the industries concerned. (35 ) 
(b) Selective Advance Control. 
The earliest technique of credit control of relevance to the 
export sector was that of selective advance control. The usual 
aim of this technique is to ensure that trading banks observe cer-
tain priorities, in lending in times of credit r e straint. In 
other words, it is used to restrict the areas in which trading 
bank advances are to be granted. The statutory authority express-
ly empowering the Bank to use this technique, is found in s.34 l(b) 
(34) The banks were g iven the right to take up Government secur-
ities to the extent that their cash exceeded the"normal min-
imum" reserve ratios, of 8 per-cent of demand aeposits, and 
3 per-cent of time deposits. In effect, therefore, individ-
ual b a~ ks were given what amounts to monthly ceilings for non-
priority advances. The penalties imposed for non-compliance 
with these ceilings, were then distributed among the banks, 
according to a formula agreed upon between the traninq banks, 
and the Reserve Bank. Each bank was required to borrow for 
1 month from the Bank, the amount by which its non-priority 
lending was charged for this borrowing, on the basis of a 
sliding scale of penal borrowing rates. Ibid. 
(35) The question of a penalty on the top tier was also examined 
RBNZ Annual Report,197 J_ , Appendices Journal H.O.R. B.16. 
of the principal Act. The Bank is permitted, where it is satis-
fied that it is necessary or expedient, and in the interest of 
the public, to direct the trading banks as to the policy to be 
followed, in respect of; 
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"The classes of advances and discounts that should be encouraged, 
or restricted, or refused, and the classes of investments that may 
or may not be made or held". 
The Bank first employed the technique in 1943, when it was in-
troduced by agreement between the Government, the Rank, and the 
trading banks. (36 ) Contrary to normal practice, however, it was 
used in the early years of the bank, to restrict the quantity of 
bank credit. Selective advance control was in fact the predominate 
technique affecting the export section, in the years up to 1963. 
It was applied by the Bank, with varying degrees of stringency 
during the 1950s, but the general practice was as follows. Ad-
vances for certain purposes were prohibited, (37 ) (subject to re-
ference to the Reserve Bank in doubtful cases). The banks were 
also allocated a maximum discretionary amount for certain other 
classes of advances, in order to introduce some flexibility into 
the system. The Bank, however, was prepared to consider marginal 
cases on their merits. A prerequisite to reference to the Bank, 
was that the advance met normal lending principles, whereas, when 
the case was referred, the name of the applicant was not revealed. 
Depending on the state of the balance of payment.s position, the 
( 3 8) · discretionary limits were lifted, or re-imposed. At all times, 
(36) The 1933 Act contained no express power enabling this tech-
nique to be employed, but although advance ~n~trol policy 
was originally introduced by agreement, the power to enforce 
the requirement clearly fell within the ambit of the Finance 
Emergency Regulations No 2, 1945. see Hawke. Op Cit. at pl42. 
cf. T.N. Bright, Banking Law and Practice in New Zealand, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1962, at p21. This writer implies that tPe 
directions before 1960 concerning advance control policy were 
based on "moral suasion". The express power to issue direr.t-
ions concerning the advance control policy, was accorded to 
the Bank in 1950 by s.45(A) inserted by the Reserve Bank Am-
endment Act, 1960. 
(37) Commonly restricted, weLe advances for speculative purposes, 
purchases of property, repayment of mortgages, for hire-pur-
chase·a~<l cre~it , sales and advances for luxury purposes. 
(38) RBNZ Pub. Money and Banking, Op Cit. 
however, the trading banks were required to give the highest 
priority "to financing the production of goods for export; to 
primary production, and to industries using a high proportion of 
locally produced raw materials, and to essential services" (39 ) 
While selective advance control is no longer a significant 
element in Government monetary policy, (4 0) certain features of 
the enforcement of the policy, contained in the present Act, are 
of interest. Unlike the enforcement of the minimum balances re-
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quirement, failure by the Bank to comply with the direction of the 
Bank, did not invalidate any transaction between the trading bank 
and its customer, which does not qualify under the control policy 
(4l) Similarly, the fact that the advance does not qualify under 
the direction, does not mean the transaction is unenforceable. 
Instead, the inducement to comply rests solely on a system of fines 
which are automatically imposed for each day that the offence con-
tinues. 
(c) Reserve m,$etS ratio system. 
The 1964 Act completely recast Part V of the Act, (42 )accord-
ing the Bank, under s.33, the additional power to introduce a re-
serve assets ratio system, with the approval of the Minister of 
Finance. This system was introduced on 1 June, 1973, and its 
(39) See e.g. RBNZ Press Release, RBNZ Bulletin,1963-4 
(40) In 1963, the detailed instructions issued by the Bank ~nn-
cerned with advance control policy were withdrawn, and it 
was no longer necessary for the banks to obtain formal Re-
serve Bank approval, for the various restricted categories 
of advances. Instead, broad guidelines were laid down which 
reiterated the principles established earlier. 
(41) s.34(b). Nothing in this section shall affect the validity 
or enforceability, as between any trading bank, and any other 
person, of any transaction. 
(42) RBNZ Bulletin, November, 1964, at pl51. 
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importance to financing for export, requires a brief review of 
its operation. (43 ) Section 33 enables the Bank to require trading 
banks to hold assetq of a specified kind, including balances at 
the Bank. (44 )Minimum requirements may be laid down as a percent-
age of all or any specified part or parts of a trading bank's 
assets , in respect of its New Zealand business. (45 ) In essence, 
the reserve assets ratio system consists of a conventional liquid-
ity requirement, with the minimum expressed as percentages of 
trading bank demand, and time deposit liabilities. (46 ) The percent-
ages may be varied by the Bank with the approval of the Minister 
of Fin?.nce. The differential ratios have the effect of allowing 
the banking system as a whole, to increase advances, by a pro-
portion of the amount of demand deposits, converted to time de-
posits. Similar to the reserve ratio system, the assets ratios 
Gny ; be varied to expand or curtail spending in the private sector. 
On the other hand, the ratios may be ~aried as a technical measure 
to take account of seasonal and random fluctuations, in the level 
of reserve assets. (47 ) These variations are intended to take acc-
ount of random fluctuations such as an increase in bank lending 
to finance an increase in export stocks, resulting from shipping 
delays, or the current income stabilisation scheme, for sheep 
farmers. (43 ) 
The new system is designed to allow 
flexible lending policies, and to make 
their own liquidity management. 
( 4 9) 
the banks more scope for 
them more responsible for 
However, while the top tier 
priority policy has been abolished, along with the ceiling-on-ad-
vances policy, the intention is that the power under s.34 of the 
Act, wil exercised by the Bank to direct the trading banks to give 
' . d (5 0) h f priority to farmers, an to exporters. Te measures o en-
forcement are the same as those laid down to ensure compliance 
with the variable reserve ratios, under s.33. 
(43) Press statement by the Minister of Finance, 28 May, 1973, 
"The Evening Post", Wellington. 
(44) s.33, (1) (b). 
(45) s.33, (2) (b) 
(46) RBNZ Bulletin, July 1973, pl72. 
( 4 7) Ibid. at pl 7 2 . 
( 4 8) Ibid. at pl 7 3. 
(49) Statement by the Minister of Finance, Op Cit, footnote 43. 
(50) Ibid. 
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~ . Banker to the Statutory Marketing Authorities 
Several marketing organisations whose operations are controlled 
by statute conduct their banking operations through the Reserve 
( 51) Bank. A statutory obligation is incumbent on the Dairy Board, 
the Apple and Pear Marketing Board (52 ) and the Honey Marketing 
Authority, (53 ) to do so, whereas those marketing eggs (54 )and 
citrus f~uits, (55 ) are permitted to establish their accounts 
either at the Reserve Bank or the Bank of New Zealand. (56 ) Each 
of these organisations was set up as a consequence of the policy of 
guaraateed prices for farm produce adopted by the first Labour 
Government of 1936. A change in the Reserve Bank Act 1933 sp~cif-
ically empowering the Bank to grant overdrafts for marketing purposes 
(51) Dairy Board Act 1961, Reprint 1967. s32 under which the 
Dairy Board is to establish the Dairy Industry Account the 
Dairy Industry Reserve Account, the Dairy Industry Capital 
Account. The operation of these accounts is prescribed in 
s33. 
(52) Apple and Pear Marketing Act 1969 s29. 
(53) Honey Marketing Regulations S.R.1964/160 s29 (1). 
(54) E Marketin Authorit Re ulations 1953 Reprint S.R. 1967/ 
229S69 1 Poultry Industry Account). 
(55) Citrus Marketing Authority Regulations S.R. 1966/64 s 20. 
These latter three authorities have been established pursuant 
to _~he. Primary Produce Marketing Act 1953.s.3. 
(56) Other accounts held by the Reserve Bank concerning primary 
production and marketing include the Dairy Industry Produce 
Development Account, the Milk Industry Account, the New 
Zealand Wool Promotion Account, the Meat Industry Account and 
various marketing imprest accounts. The Meat Industry Account 
is administered by the Department of Agriculture and the 
funds in this account are part of the primary industry res-
serves. The bulk of advances under these accounts normally 
comprise amounts to finance stocks of dairy produce held the 
Dairy Board. RBNZ Bulletin Dec. p. 292, 293. 
was made by the Reserve Bank Amendment Act 1936. This clause 
was repealed by the present Act along with others granting special 
powers, the situation now being covered by a general empowering 
clause which is limited by a new section setting out specified 
restrictions on the Bank's powers. (57 )During its history the 
Bank has also acted as banker in respect of wool and meat market-
ing as a consequence of the bulk purchase arrangements for meat, 
wool and dairy produce which were renegotiated between the New 
Zealand and United Kingdom Governments each year during the Second 
Werld War and for some years afterwards. ( 58 )The provision of fin-
ance in respect of meat and wool marketing however was handed back 
to the trading banks upon the resumption of private trading for 
these commodities in 1954 and 1947 respectively. (59 )0f the 
present marketing authorities only the Dairy Board, the Apple and 
Pear Marketing Board, and the Honey Marketing Authority are engaged 
in export marketing. For these reasons this section is mainly con-
fined to discussing the banker/customer relationsfilips enjoyed by 
(57) s 10 Reserve Bank Act 1964. 
(58) For details of the Bulk Purchase Arrangements see J.V.T. 
Banker, War Economy. A Historl of New Zealand in the Second 
World War Vol. 1 1 963 at p. 7. 
(59) Certain accounts have been held since at the Reserve Bank in 
respect of these commodities notably the wool Commission 
Account arising from the collapse of wool prices in the 1966 
- 67 season. See Hawke op. cit. at p. 89. The meat industry 
account is administered by the Department of Agriculture. 
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each of these authorities and the Bank. 
The relationships between the Bank and the Dairy Board and the 
Apple and Pear Marketing Board are remarkable in terms of normal 
banking practice. First the operation of their accounts and the 
actions of the respective parties to them are prescribed in detail 
by statute. Secondly, in certain situations, the respective statutes 
prescribe for the entry of a· .• third party, the Government, into the 
relationship, thirdly, their accounts are operated in such a way 
that they depart from the standard principles of bank lending. 
The operation of the marketing accounts may best be illustrated 
by situation regarding the Dairy Board. When the Dairy Board pays 
the dairy companies for produce acquired for export it must draw 
on the Dairy Industry Account:·, ( 60 ) , the proceeds from its pur-
chase being credited toutte ·trading bank accounts of the various 
dairy co-operatives. The proceeds of the sale of produce overseas 
enter its overseas Reserve Bank account, for instance at the Bank 
of England, wnile the Bank credits the Dairy ~ndustry Account in 
Wellington. During the time elapsing between purchase and sale, 
accommodation by way of overdraft may be granted by the Bank in 
aid of the Dairy Industry account, ( 61) A prima facie limit 
however, is prescribed by statute on the extent to which the account 
may be overdrawn. The overdraft is not to exceed in amount the 
(60) s 33 Dairy Board Act 1961. 
(61) lbid s 33 (3) similarly s 32 (1) Apple and Pear Marketing 
Act. 
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total purchase price of product acquired by the Board and which 
is either considered or in respect of which no part of the selling 
price has been received, together with an amount representing 
other expenses paid in connection with the product such as freight, 
storage, insurance, advertising and administration salaries. (62) 
Unsecured lending by the Bank (in effect an advance on the basis 
described above is unsecured) is not permitted under the Reserve 
( 6 3) 
Bank Act without the prior consent of the Minister. This 
conflict however, is expressly recognised in the Apple and Pear 
Marketing Act, ( 64 ) thus the accommodation so granted is deemed for 
the purpose of the Reserve Bank Act not to be 'lending without 
secruity.' The situation as regards the Dairy Board is less clear 
because of an anomaly in the Act but in practice it is submitted 
the same course would be followed. ( 6 5 ) 
(62) The Reserve Bank is entitled to accept a certificate in writing 
presented by duly authorised officers of the Board which is 
to be inclusive evidence of the valve of the prescribed com-
ponant items. s 33 (3) . A similar practice is provided for 
in the Pear Marketing Act 32 (1). 
(63) s 9 1 (d) Reserve Bank Act 1964. 
(64) The Apple and Pear Marketing Acts 32 (2) 
(65) The corresponding provisions 33. 4 of the Dairy Board Act 
1961 which appears in the 1967 Reprint relates to s 14 (d) 
of the 1933 Reserve Bank Act which expressly prohibited the 
Bank from making unsecured loans or advances except with the 
authority of the Governor General. A curious note to this 
clause appearing in the 1967 Reprint of the Dairy Board Act 
1961 to the effect that 'there is no provision ins 10 (i.e. 
the news 14) dealing with unsecured loans, · does not clarify 
the situation. A strict reading of s 33 (4) would lead to 
the result that the consent of the Minister would be reqgired 
before the Dairy Board could go into overdraft. This however, 
would be an intolerable situation and it is likely that the 
clause is read by the Bank and the Dairy Board as now applying 
to s 9 (1) of the Reserve Bank Act 1964. 
tor a 
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The overdraft limit may however be extended with the consent of 
the Minister of Finance in writing. There is no limit prescribed 
as to the extent to which accommodation may be granted by the Bank. 
In practice this is a matter for political decision. The Bank 
nevertheless is not expected to carry the burden of a decision by 
the Government to permit an extension of the limit to a point 
which the Bank considers would not be prudent. The Minister of 
Finance in this situation or in any case where his consent is re-
quired otherwise may give such guarnatees to the Bank in respect 
of the advances to either the Dairy Board or the Apple and Pear 
Board as he thinks fit. (66 ) 
The rate of interest on advances to most of the marketing auth-
orities has remained at 1 per cent since the commencement of 
Government marketing department arrangements in the war. It is 
nautural therefore that the facility of a Reserve Bank Account has 
been utilised by those marketing orgainsations with an option to 
use either the Reserve Bank or the bank of New Zealand as their 
banker. It is also natural that the decision of Government to 
maintain the rate at this level has been controversial. The main 
(66) Dairy Board Acts 38; Apple and Pear Marketing Act. The 
marketing authorities established by statutory regulation 
pursuant to the Primary Products Marketing Act 1953 may 
also obtain a guarantee or indemnity from the Minister of 
Finance The marketing authorities are not per-
mitted to borrow without the consent in writing of the Min-
ister of Finance (s 10 (3) ) . Any payments required in 
respect of the default of the authorities are frp~ 
Consolidated Fund. e.g. In May 1963 the Government announced 
that it was providing assistance to the dairy industry by 
way of special guarantee of the Boards overdraft at the 
Reserve Bank in order to provide the necessary resources for 
establishing milk reconstitution plants in · developing count-
ries. The special account established for this purpose 
bore interest however, at 3 per cent payment of which was 
deferred during the establishment of the projects. RBNZ 
Bulletin 1963 p. 154. 
arguments against the low rates, and indeed, the operation of the 
marketing accounts at the Reserve Bank, rather than at trading 
banks were expressed in two recommendations of the 1955 Monetary 
Commission. 
( 6 7) 
Despite the controversy and at one stage aginst 
35 
h d t . f th B k . t 1 f ( 6 8 ) · t e recommen a ion o e an i se , successive Governments 
have been unwilling mainly for political reasons to communicate a 
change of policy to the Bank to this effect, although variations 
in the rates differ~ . In fact it has also been argued, that there 
may be sound economic reasons for not doing so. (69) 
In any event the establishment of the accounts and their opera-
tion evidence the importance that the state has always placed on 
(67) The 1955 Monetary Commission while considering that the Dairy Account by virtue of its size should remain at the Bank considered that 'in general we think it indesireable that the Reserve Bank should finance commercial transactions of this kind and would recommend that steps be taken to transfer the accounts of the other makketing authorities to the trading banks' ... and that 'there is no reason why statutory marketing authorities by virtue of the fact that their accounts are held at the Reserve Bank should receive preferential treatment in respect to interest charges.' It concluded that 'the rate of interst payable on an advance granted by the Reserve Bank to a statutory body should be similar to that which it would be required to pay if its finance was obtained from the trading banks. Report of the Royal Commission on Monetary Banking and Credit Systems 1956 Govt. Printer para 611 and 612. 
(68) Hawke op cit p. 87. 
(69) Ibid pp 88-89. 
the economic welfare of those farm industries which ea~n the 
bulk of New Zealand's overseas e xchange. (?O)That the operation 
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of the accounts depart from fundamental principles of bank lending 
in respect of security and profitability has never been considered 
by Governments as important. Instead the operation of the accounts 
particularly the Dairy Industry Account at the Reserve Bank and 
the statutory powers enjoyed by the Minister of Finance have en-
abled the State to intervene readily and on a flexible basis to 
ensure that the provision of credit facilities is not ~mpeded. 
In this way the statutory marketing legislation provides perhaps 
the best example of the employment by the State of a number of 
techniques of law to influence export financing. 
(70) The fundamental principle of trading bank lending was stated 
by the Associated Banks in New Ze~land (now the NZ Bankers 
Association) in evidence to the 1955 Monetary Commission to 
be 'to confine advances as far as possible to financing 
customers current trade or seas onal requirements and to avoid 
tying up available resources inf i xed or lona term finance . 
The factors to which main importance is attached are, (1) 
rhe purpos 0 of the advance and the nature of the business , 
(2) the source from which repayment is expected t o b e ma d e , 
(3) the character and business capacity of the borrower, (4) 
the nature and adequacy of the security offered and the fin-
ancial position of the borrower. An advance may also be 
declined because the prospects of obtaining with a reasonable 
time from sources other than a forced realisation do not appear 
satisfactory. 
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~.D. The Bank and Export Credits 
1. Background 
Export credits take two basic forms namely suppliers credits 
and buyers credits. (?l) Suppliers credits are granted by suppliers 
to foreign buyers either on a medium term basis or on a long 
term basis. Since few suppliers selling on deferred payment 
terms have sufficient resources to bridge the credit period, most 
of them finance the credits they grant with a credit institution 
notably a trading bank which generally refinances them under an 
export credit refinancing scheme with the central Bank or 
specialised institution. Buyers credits are granted directly to 
foreign buyers by credit institutions or consortia or credit in-
stitutions in countries exporting capital goods to enable them 
to acquire the needed capital good or services by paying cash 
to the suppliers, the Governments of the exporting countries 
guaranteeing repayment under their export credit insurance schemes. 
In the export credit situation the only parties involved other 
than the importer and or bank are the exporter and a government 
agency. The Government agency actually finances all or a portion 
of the expor~s by paying the exporter and taking over the pro-
missory notes or other securities, which evidence the credit 
(71) A full description of the various arrangements implied by 
these terms are set out in National Export Credit Systems 
1969. UN pub: Sales No. E. 69 II D 7 Intro. 
extended to the importer. The Government agency has direct 
contractual relations only with the exporter. ( 72 > 
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Export credits have played a much lesser role in New Zealand's 
export trade th~~ in the export trade of other developed market 
economy countries. There are three main reasons. 
First New Zealand is fundamentally a capital importing country 
being in a similar position to many developing countries in terms 
of capital needs. 
Secondly primary products and manufactured consumption goods 
have traditionally iormed the bulk of New Zealand's exports 
rather than capital goods. Overseas importers of these goods 
can normally recoup their expenditure quickly, thereby obviating 
the need for all but short term credit b0 c6ver the transitional 
period. 
Thirdly the most of New Zealand's exports are destined for 
developed market economy countries which do not s e ek soft credit 
terms. 
For these reasons early action by Government was taken in 
response to specific request for economic aid. More recently 
Government has been compelled to look beyon~ bilateral lines of 
credit, in order to promote the diversification of both the range 
of exports of goods and services and markets. The facilities 
(72) International Financing and Investment. Export Financing 
J.F.McDaniels New York 1964. Part V p. 379. 
sponsored by Government are designed to overcome the lack of 
well established private institutional facitlites for financing 
longer term export credits. The instrument through which the 
provision of suppliers credits by the trading banks is encour-
aged is the Reserve Bank. 
2. Long Term Export Credit Arrangements 
a) Refinancing by the Bank 
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The first facility of this type, announced in 1969, enables 
the Bank to make loans on reasonable terms to New Zealand trading 
banks to replace funds, (73 ) which that bank has used to finance 
exports in terms of over 12 months. The loan must be valued at 
over $20,000 and no specific security is required. (74 ) Applicat-
ions for the loans may be made after the credit has been extended 
by the trading bank but it is preferred that the appl±cation is 
made prior to the period for which the credit has been given. 
The Bank gives commitments of rates and amounts before exporters 
(73) The original intention of the Bank was to rediscount long 
term export bills. DiscussQon with the trading banks how-
ever, revealed that rediscounting was an unnecessarily 
complicated method. The alternative system of making loans 
as counter-part funds for the credits, the trading banks 
had extended to their customers was s:yled on the exper-
ience of the Australian Export Refinance Corporation. 
Annual Report of the Bank 1970. Appendices, Journals H.O.R. 
1970. B 16. 
(74) The Bank has power to make loans on such security as it 
requires. Where a loan without security is contemplated 
the prior consent of the Minister is required. s 9 (8) (d). 
have a firm order. If the exporter fails to obtain the 
o~der, the trading bank is requested to cancel the commitment 
rather than let i$ ~apse. 
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Unlike r e discounting the Bank incurs no liability for the 
default of the overseas buyer -as the trading bank receiving the 
loan undertakes in its application to p~Y the Reserve Bank the 
spcified amount on specified dates. 
Since the terms of the credit would normally eventuate in the 
breach of exchange control regulations, in that the proceeds of 
specific exports are not received with in the statutory six months, 
the Bank gives approval under the regulations to this requirement 
being covered. Approval, however is conditional on the Bank 
being satisfied that the ~~tended credit is normal in the part-
icular trade or that in a specific instance it is necessary in 
order to make the sale. 
b) Rediscounting by the Bank 
1 December 1971 an extension to this facility was announced (75 ) 
involving different legal relationships for the Bank. Under the 
new arrangement the Banker is prepared to rediscount bills with-
out recourse under a line of credit available through the trading 
b a nks to finance export supplies credits. The facility is gen-
erally only available whe r e a sale would be likely to lead to 
the development of further trade. (76 ) It is also intended to 
(75) Annual Report RBNZ 1972 
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cover those c ases where suppliers credits must be for longer or 
softer terms than usual and which may incorporate grace periods 
during which there are no payments of interest or repayment. 
The scheme takes the form of a revolving credit of $2 million 
established by the Bank. Exporters with specific proposals r 
apply in advnace through their trading banks to the Bank. Since 
the Bank is not in a position to establish the credit worthiness 
of individual impo~ters a number of safeguards are built into 
the scheme to protect the Bank. To discourage exporters from 
concluding contracts without due regard for the credit worthiness 
of the purchaser, the Bank requires that either a stipulated 
proportion of the sale price is withheld from the advance or, 
where appropriate, the exporter is held liable for default 
up to the amount that whole otherwise have been withheld. 
In addition the Bank requires an acceptable irrevocable letter 
of credit or other i n struments to be established by the impor~er ' s 
bankers which provides for the meeting of bills drawn by the 
e xporter and incorporating certain terms. ( 77 ) The Bank 
(76) The New Zealand content of the propsed exports is expected 
to be the maximum possible, but in consi.deri,ng i,ndividual 
cases this factor is weighed against profitability. 
(77) The terms are as follows 
i) Interest at a rate which is decided in the light of cir-
cumstances at the time of the application. 
ii) The first bill normally to mature no later than two 
years after shipment, or completion of the contract. 
iii) The remaining bills to mature at regular intervals and 
repayment to be compJeted normally no later than 5 years 
after shipment or completion of the contract. 
iv) The arrangement to be expressed and payable in $US, ster-
ling. or some other convertible currency (the actual currency 
is decided at the time of application. 
also requires the exporter to take out cover, with the Export 
Guarantee Office. 
3. Trade Aid Credits 
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Sinc e 1947, a number of Government bilateral credit agreements 
have been concluded by New Zealand with other countries, to enable 
the latter to purchase New Zealand products. (78 ) Each of these in-
struments was executed to meet a specific aid or economic <levelopment 
(79) I situation. At the same time, each was conclude(with a view to 
advancing New i ealand's trade interests, although in some aqreements, 
the element of New Zealand's trade was more inmportant than in others. 
(30) Only two credits involved New Zealand goods other than major 
primary commodities, but in practice, traders of primary products 
have been the main beneficiaries (8l) under the schemes. 
To enable the Government to conclude the first loan agreement with 
France in 1947, using the medium of the Reserve Bank, the 1933 Act 
was amended. (82 ) The Bank was thence-forth empowered to "advance 
(78) Agreement between the Government of France and N.Z. for the 
purchase of N.Z. wool, 2 July, 1947, 1948 Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Reps., Vol.I A.9; Agreement between the 
Governments of Czechoslovakia and N.Z., regarding the purchase of NZ 
wool, 22 January, 1948, 1948 A.J.HOR A.10; Agreement between the 
Governments of NZ and In~ia, regarding the purchase of wool, 22 Feb-
ruary, 1963, 1963 A.J. HOR A.10; Agreement between the Governments 
of NZ and Peru, concerning the purchase of NZ dairy products. 3 Dec-
ember, 1969, 1970 A.J. HOR Vol I, A.20; Agreement between the Gov-
ernments of NZ and Indonesia, 1970, A.J.EOR Vol I, A.21, renewed 1971, 
1972, 1973. 
(79) e.g. the Indonesian credit originated as part of an internation-
al b ~lance of payments rescue operation. Similarly, the French 
credit was part of the post-war reconstruction programme in Europe. 
(80) e.g. the Peruvian credit was offered primarily in order to enable 
the Dairy Board to secure its established share of the market 
that was b 0 ing threatened by concessional sales from the EEC. Annual 
2eport, Department of Trade and Industry. 
(81) The French credit was predomina~tly used for wool exports. The 
major beneficiaries under the Indonesian credit have been the 
Dairy Board, and the pulp and paper producers. 
(82) Finance Act (No.2) 1946 s.4 
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monies to the Government of any country in respect of any New 7.ealand 
produce for export to that country, or guarantee any such advance 
that may be made by any other bank" Transactions for this purpose 
were required to be approved by the Minister of Finance, and more-
over, the amount involved was not to exceed a ceiling of 10 million 
pounds. 
Neither the ceiling of lending, nor the "tied 1 oan" prescription 
· th t A t (83 ) Th t · · also di' ffers appear in e presen c. e presen provision 
in that the power to grant loans to other Governments is implicit in 
the powers conferred on the Bank under s.9 (1). For this reason, the 
present section acts to limit these broader powers by the requirements 
that the Minister of Finance must approve such loans. The amount 
of any loss by the Bank in respect of any loan, advance, credit or 
guarantee for this purpose, is paid to the Bank out of the public 
account. 
The ~orm of the more recent agreements substantially follows ~hat 
of earlier credit agreements with France, Czechoslovakia and India. (84 ) 
The New Zealand Government extended the credit to the recipient gov-
ernment, in return for which, the recipient agreed to apply the credit 
sole l y to purchases of New Zealand origin. (8S) Associated with the 
Peruvian Agreement was a five year commercial agreement between the 
NZ Dairy Board, and the Peruvian Government purchasing agency, EPSAP, 
which agreed to purchase not less than 63 per cent of its annual re-
quirements of skim milk powder and anhydrous milk fat from the Dairy 
Board. Thus the Government of Peru also guaranteed to purchase no 
lesser quantity than was provided in the commercial agreement. If 
this obligation was not complied with, the total amount of loan moneys 
(83) s.11 RB Act 1964. 
(84) The Indonesian Credit 1973 is the only agreement presently in 
force. The Peruvian Credit expired in October 1971, and all 
purchases are now being made on commercial terms. 
(BS) Peruvian Agreement Act 1 (1); Indonesian Credit Act 1 (1) · 
and interest owed by the Government of Peru became immediately repay-
able. 
The Indonesian Credit agreement differs in that the Indonesian 
Government determines the commodities eligible for credit financing. 
(86 ) The advantage of the credit for the importer is that he may pur-
chase funds at a lower rate of exchange than that applying to normal 
exchange transactions. 
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Drawings under each agreement have been administered by the respect-
ive ~e~tral banks, the procedures in respect of which, vary in com-
plexity with the nature of the trade, in the commodity contemplated 
under the Agreement, or in the case of the Indonesian agreement, that 
which the central banks decide. An account has been gen0rally opened 
with the Reserve Bank, which records all the operations in connection 
. . (8!7) . . . . with the credit, · details concerning which, are normally provided 
in a protocol of signature attached to the agreement. 
The technique of providing export credits through bilateral inter-
govermental agreement is well established overseas. Unlike the special 
export credit facilities provided by the Bank, however, the technique 
is inflexible, and often requires time consuming negotiation. An add-
ed disadvantage for New Zealand, is the aid element which is incorpor-
ated into the agreements. This makes such agreements difficult for 
any capital importing country, to sustain f0! prolonged periods. For 
these reasons, New Zealand has not been prepared to enter readily into 
long term commitments of this nature. The New Zealand aqreements have 
also been used almost entirely for agricultural products, thus sub-
sidising products of the least importance in the diversification of the 
~ew Zealand economy. 
(86) Imports are classified according to their essentiality. For its 
part, the NZ Government has stipulated that only goods with a 60 
per cent NZ content ( in terms of f.o.b. price) qualify for ex-
port under the credit. 
87) The accounts have generally been expressed in TT.S. dollars, or 
Sterling. 
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Conclusion 
The law and practice of State intervention in the field of 
financing New Zealand's export trade, has been derived from two 
major sources. Whatever techniques have been employed to implement 
the monetary policies of Government, finance for the export sector 
(although this term was formerly thought to be synonomous with the 
agricultural sector) has received first priority. The second source 
is the law and practice of existing institutions, and those new in-
stitutions established to meet demands which had been created by the 
diversification policies of recent Governments. 
Existing institutions have been adapted, and re-orientated. The 
Reserve Bank has assumed a promotional role, as a financer of the 
export trade, in its own right. The DFC is being granted a more 
prominent position in the financial system, namely, as the Country's 
development bank, with attributes similar to those of its counter-
parts in developing countries. 
The practice of these instituuees, departs in fundamental ways, 
from the traditional practice of private sector institutions. The 
difference in practice is largely explained by the fact that New 
Zealand inherited private institutions, modelled on parents whose 
characteristics were not appropriate to the needs of a developing 
country. As the demands fnr export orientated development finance 
grow, it must be expected that statutory prescription will correct 
any inability on the part of the private financial community, to 
adapt to this environment. 
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